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Permit me to start by thanking the Atlantic Human Rights Centre and the Friends 
of Bernie Vigod for inviting me to deliver this Second Dr. Bernie Vigod Memorial 
Lecture. At the outset, I would like to pay tribute to four people associated with 
this lecture series and with the Centre. First, of course, is the man in whose 
memory the lecture series was established, Dr. Bernie Vigod, who died so young, 
but who accomplished so much in so many different ways in forwarding human 
rights. I am greatly honoured that his widow, his parents and his brother are here 
tonight. I must also pay tribute to the man who was involved in the administration 
of this Centre from the beginning, but who died too soon to see its development, 
Dr. Lodhi. Third, I want to pay my respects to the man who has been a Chief 
Commissioner of a human rights commission longer than anyone else in Canada 
and who was the inspiration at St. Thomas University for the Centre, Dr. Noel 
Kinsella, now Senator Kinsella. Fourth, but to anyone who knows her, by no 
means ever last, is the first Bernie Vigod Lecturer, one of the most intelligent and 
vivacious contributors to the promotion of human rights, Dr. Rosalie Abella.
I. Discrimination and the Law Before the Constitution Act, 1867
Before Confederation, race relations in the territories that became Canada 
commenced with slavery. There were a few slaves, both black and Amerindian, 
in New France as early as the seventeenth century.1 The British settlers (largely 
from the thirteen colonies to the south) brought slaves with them. Even before 
then, slaves were brought into Nova Scotia from the time of the founding of 
Halifax.2 Many Loyalists who came into the Atlantic region after the American 
Revolution brought slaves with them, although freed black Loyalists immigrated 
as well.
At the same time it must be acknowledged that there was opposition to the 
practice. The coming of the end of slavery was spurred by legislative action in 
Upper Canada in 1793,3 by judicial action in Lower Canada just after the turn of
Justice of the Court of Appeal of Ontario. Dr. Bernie Vigod Memorial Lecture delivered at the 
Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick, 1 November 1991. The lecture is also being published 
by the Atlantic Human Rights Centre.
*For a detailed study of slavery in New France see M. T rude I, L ’esclavage au Canada français: Histoire 
et conditions de l ’esclavage (Québec: Les presses de l’Université Laval, 1960). For a detailed history 
of blacks in Canada see R. Winks, The Blacks in Canada (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 
On this point see Winks, at 22.
2D.H. Clairmont and D.W. Magill, Nova Scotia Blacks: An Historical and Structural Overview (Halifax: 
Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, No. 83, 1970) at 6.
3S.U.C. 1793 (2nd Sess.), c. 7. This Act merely prohibited the further introduction of slaves into the 
province and provided that children of female slaves bom thereafter would attain freedom at age 25.
the century,4 and by some combination of both in Nova Scotia by about 1810.5 
In New Brunswick, it appears that the legality of slavery was challenged in 1800 
but, by a decision of 2-2 of the full bench, was sustained.6 Nevertheless, it 
appears that during the decade before the Emancipation A ct of 1833,7 it had 
virtually disappeared as a practice in all the British North American colonies.8
After the abolition of slavery in the British North American colonies there was 
for some time considerable sympathy for the slaves fleeing the slave-holding 
territories in the United States. At the same time, however, as some Canadians 
were attempting to help freed slaves to resettle in Canada, others were 
discouraging them, and many forms of action, both official and private, resulted 
in restrictions of opportunities for those blacks who had come to Canada. A 
number of attempted settlement schemes failed because of a variety of adverse 
circumstances.9 Partly as a result of these factors, and partly because of the 
attraction of returning to familiar places and friends and families, many black 
settlers returned to the United States after the end of the American Civil War.
Those that remained faced encouragement and support from some whites, but 
hostility and discrimination from others.10 As will be indicated later, there was
4In 1795 a Montreal judge refused to recognize the status of “runaway slave”, and, in 1798, Chief 
Justice Monk of the Court of King’s Bench in Montreal released two slaves and declared that he 
thought slavery did not exist in Lower Canada: Trudel, supra, note 1 at 301-2, and Winks, supra note 
1 at 100.
5See Ida C. Greaves, The Negro in Canada (Orillia: Packet Times Press, 1930) at 19-20.
6See T.W. Smith, “The Slave in Canada” (1899) Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society at 
97-105 and W A  Spray, The Blacks in New Brunswick (Fredericton, N.B.: Brunswick Press, 1972), at 
23-6. I am indebted to Prof. Donald Fleming, Acting Director of the Atlantic Human Rights Centre, 
for drawing my attention to accounts of this trial in J.W. Lawrence, The Judges o f New Brunswick, 
(Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1983) at 70, 76 and 268-9. Apparently the slave owner, although 
successful, challenged one of the two judges who held against him to a duel. Although Judge Allen 
declined, he did confirm his own moral and legal stand by freeing his own slaves. Also, one of the 
legal counsel for the slave challenged one of those acting for the slave owner, to a duel. This was 
accepted, the pistol duel took place in front of the courthouse, both missed and, although both 
indicated a desire to try again, their seconds negotiated a reconciliation.
7An Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Colonies: for promoting the Industry o f the 
Manumitted Slaves; and for compensating the Persons Hitherto entitled to the Services o f such Slaves 
(U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73.
8 Supra, note 5 at 19-20.
^ in k s , supra, note 1 at 130-31 and 204-05. For a fuller anecdotal account see D.G. Hill, The 
Freedom-Seekers: Blacks in Early Canada (Agincourt: Book Society of Canada, 1981) c. 5. Probably 
the most successful black settlement in Canada was on Vancouver Island. See Winks, supra, note 1, 
c. 9; J.W. Pilton, Negro Settlement in British Columbia (M A. Thesis, U.B.C., 1951); C. Kilian, Go Do 
Some Great Thing (Vancouver Douglas & McIntyre, 1978).
10For an account of the many tribulations see Hill, ibid., c. 6, 8, 9, and 10.
nothing in the law to prohibit discrimination. Nevertheless, the legislatures did not 
enact discriminatory laws against blacks, except for the way in which schools 
legislation was applied to establish segregated schools.11 Legal challenges to this 
segregation failed,12 and separate schools for black children continued in Windsor 
until 1888, in Chatham until 1890, and in Amherstburg until 1910.13 The 
legislation, however, remained on the statute books until 1964, when Professor 
Harry Arthurs drew attention to it in a note in the Canadian Bar Review of 
1963.14 Segregated schools were also a feature of black education in the 
nineteenth century in Nova Scotia and to a lesser extent because of a smaller 
population, in New Brunswick. Segregated schools continued in Nova Scotia until 
the 1960s.15
II. Discrimination and the Law Before the Human Rights Codes
1. The Constitutional Position
Apart from some provisions protecting the English and French languages in 
s.133, and others protecting certain rights to religious schools in s.93, the 
Constitution Act, 1867, makes no reference to equality rights. More importantly, 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided early in our constitutional 
history that discrimination was not a basis for invalidating legislation. In Union 
Colliery v. Bryden,16 the court dealt with a challenge to British Columbia 
legislation forbidding “Chinamen” from working underground in mines. The 
Judicial Committee made it clear that it was not concerned whether the exercise 
of legislative power was “discreet”, and that “courts of law have no right whatever 
to inquire whether [the] jurisdiction has been exercised wisely or not.” Similarly, 
in Cunningham v. Tomey H omma ,17 the Judicial Committee was faced with a 
provision in the British Columbia Elections Act denying the franchise to 
“Chinamen, Japanese and Indians”. The court declared that “the policy or 
impolicy of such an enactment as that which excludes a particular race from the 
franchise is not a topic upon which their Lordships are entitled to consider.” 
Although in the former case the legislation was held invalid on the ground that it 
infringed federal jurisdiction over “naturalization and aliens”, it is quite clear from
n Hill, supra, note 9 at 102-03 and 153-59.
12 Ibid. at 156. For citations of the relevant cases see Arthurs, infra, note 14.
13 Ibid. at 154-55 and 157.
1441 Can. Bar Rev. 453.
15Winks, supra, note 1 at 362-89, 364-65 and 386.
16[1899] A.C. 580.
17[1903] A.C. 151.
both cases that as long as provincial legislation was not beyond the jurisdiction of 
the province, it was valid, even though it discriminated on racial or any other 
grounds.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1914 the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
the case of Quong-Wing v. The King,18 upheld the validity of a Saskatchewan Act 
prohibiting white women from residing or working in “any restaurant, laundry or 
other place of business or amusement owned, kept or managed by any Chinaman”.
2. Discriminatory Laws
(a) Immigration
Although, as will be discussed later, administrative measures were frequently 
resorted to for the purpose of restricting non-white immigration, the only 
Canadian immigration statute to provide specifically for racial restriction was the 
Chinese Immigration Act, first enacted in 1885.19 The first Chinese immigrants 
had arrived in British Columbia during the Fraser River gold rush, in the late 
1850s, mostly from California, where they had joined the Gold rush of 1849.20
At first, since their numbers were quite small and, since they seemed on the 
whole to work mines abandoned by whites, no great opposition to their presence 
manifested itself.
However, opposition to the presence of the Chinese population reached the 
new British Columbia legislature as early as 1872, and by 1876 the legislature 
passed a resolution to the effect that “it is expedient for the Government to take 
some steps (at as early a date as possible) to prevent this Province being overrun
18(1914), 49 S.C.R. 440.
19S.C. 1885, c.71. This act had been preceded by the Immigration Act of 1869 (S.C. 1869, c.10) and 
1872 (S.C. 1872, c.28). Although these had been designed partly to protect European immigrants -  
e.g., s.3 of the act of 1869 required the number of allowable passengers to be related to the size of 
the vessel, and ss 11 and 12 required the protection of immigrant women from seduction by sailors 
-  they also provided for restrictions on the physically and mentally handicapped (s .l l  of the act of 
1869), and the destitute (s.16 of the Act of 1869) and the exclusion of “criminals and other vicious” 
immigrants (s.10 of the Act of 1872).
^For a sympathetic account see J.F. Kranter and M. Davis, Minority Canadians: Ethnic Groups 
(Toronto: Methuen, 1978) at 60ff. For an unsympathetic account see F.W. Howay (described as 
“Judge of County Court of Westminster, President of Art, Historical and Scientific Society”), British 
Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present (Vancouver: S.C. Clarke, 1914) vol.II at 567ff. For a 
later unsympathetic account see T. Maclnnes, Oriental Occupation of British Columbia (Vancouver: 
Sun Publishing, 1927).
with a Chinese population to the injury of the settled population of the 
country.”21 In 1878 the legislature resolved that no Chinese could be employed 
on provincial public works,22 and the following year a Select Committee requested 
federal authorities to “restrict the further immigration of these undesirable 
people.”23
Protests against the use of Chinese labour and against the presence of the 
Chinese continued in the early 1880s. In 1884 the British Columbia legislature 
passed three restrictive statutes, one of which prohibited further Chinese 
immigration. This act was disallowed as interfering with federal jurisdiction over 
immigration.24 In early 1885 the British Columbia legislature re-enacted the 
disallowed act, adding a $50 tax on every Chinese immigrant, but this was again 
disallowed.25 Finally, in 1885, following the report of a Special Commission on 
Chinese Immigration,26 which had held sittings during 1884, Parliament enacted 
the Chinese Immigration Act.
The long title of the act gives its real purpose: an A ct to restrict and regulate 
Chinese immigration into Canada, and the preamble indicates its extension to 
include provision for “a system of registration and control over Chinese 
immigrants residing in Canada”. The number of Chinese immigrants on ships was 
restricted to one per fifty tons of tonnage, while a $50 entry duty on every Chinese 
immigrant was imposed. Those already in Canada were exempted from the duty, 
“but every such Chinese person who desires to remain in Canada, could obtain, 
within twelve months ... and upon payment of a fee of fifty cents, a certificate of 
such residence”. In 1900 the federal government raised the duty to $100 and, in 
1903, it was raised to $500.
In 1923 a new Chinese Immigration A ct was enacted27 which, because of its 
effectiveness in discouraging Chinese immigration, has been called the Chinese 
Exclusion Act.28 The restrictions were not only insulting, they were so broad and
21B.C., Legislature Journals at 46 (1876). See Howay, supra, note 20 at 570. There is also evidence that 
the Chinese residents were also actively discouraging further immigration. See Chuen-Yan Li, 
“Chinese Attempts to Discourage Emigration to Canada: Some Findings from the Chinese Archives 
in Victoria” (1973) 18 B.C. Studies 33.
^S.B.C. 1878, c. 35.
^B.C., Legislature Journals, (1879), 20, 47, 55, XXIV.
^S.B.C. 1884, c. 3, see G.V. LaForest, Disallowance and Reservation o f Provincial Legislation (Ottawa: 
s.n., 1955) at 89.
25 Ibid.
26 Report o f  the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, Minutes of Evidence (Ottawa, 1884).
^S.C. 1923, c. 38.
so open to arbitrary determination that Chinese immigration effectively ceased. 
It is estimated that from 1923 until 1947,29 when the 1923 act was finally repealed, 
only some forty-four Chinese immigrants had entered Canada legally.30
Meanwhile, although no special statute was enacted, restrictions were applied 
to other Asiatics by other means. Japanese immigration did not commence in any 
numbers until the mid-1880s and even then, most Japanese did not stay long.31 
However when, in 1907, a large number of Japanese immigrants came to Canada 
because of United States restrictions to Hawaii, and a riot against both Chinese 
and Japanese broke out in Vancouver, the Canadian government was moved to 
enter into negotiations with the Japanese government, ending in a “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement” of 1908,32 whereby the Japanese government agreed to permit only: 
returning immigrants and their wives and children; immigrants engaged by 
Japanese-Canadians for personal or domestic service; labourers under specific 
Canadian government contract or contracts with Japanese-Canadian farmers. An 
annual quota of 400 persons was fixed for all but the first group. In 1924 this 
agreement was modified to 150. In 1928 a further limitation was introduced to 
include women and children within the quota.33
Immigration from the Indian subcontinent began at the end of the 19th 
century, the largest number seems to have arrived in 1907, when about 700 were 
expelled from Seattle and surrounding communities. These were among those 
attacked in the riots of that year.34 By 1909, the Canadian government required 
that immigrants had to reach Canada via a single continuous journey.35 Since 
almost no ship sailed directly from India to Canada, very few came thereafter.36 
When, in 1914, a ship arrived in Vancouver with several hundred Sikhs, they were 
not permitted to disembark and, after several months, returned to India.37
^S.C. 1947, c. 19, s. 4.
^S.W. Kung, “Chinese Immigration into North America” (1962) 68 Queen’s Quarterly 612.
31Kranter and Davis, supra note 20 at 64; K. Adachi, A History o f the Japanese Canadian in British 
Columbia, '1877-1958 (Vancouver History Committee of the National Japanese Canadians Citizens’ 
Association, 1958) at 1-3. Also see the Report o f the Royal Commission on Oriental Immigration 
(Ottawa, 1902).
32Adachi, ibid. at 3-4.
33Ibid.
^Kranter and Davis, supra, note 20 at 86. Also see T. Ferguson, A White Man’s Country (Toronto: 
Doubleday, 1975) at 2-7.
35T.H. Baggs, “The Oriental on the Pacific Coast” (1926) 33 Queen’s Quarterly 318.
36Kranter and Davis, supra, note 20 at 86, referring to Ferguson, supra, note 34 at 7. The statistics 
bear this out: 2,623 immigrants in 1908, 5 in 1910, 37 in 1911, 3 in 1912.
37M A. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History (Vancouver: Macmillan, 1971) at 350, cited in Kranter and 
Davis, ibid. at 86. See also E. Nichol, Vancouver (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1970) at 134-39.
Finally, in the 1950s, agreements were reached with the new governments of India, 
Pakistan, and Ceylon to admit 150,100, and 50 immigrants respectively from each 
country, plus spouses, unmarried children under twenty-one, and fathers over sixty- 
five, mothers over sixty. Also, for the first time, immigration offices were opened 
in these countries.38
In 1952 a new Immigration A ct was enacted,39 but the above-mentioned 
restrictions were continued. Section 61 provided for the Governor in Council to 
make regulations for prohibiting, amongst others, immigrants by reasons of: (g)(i) 
“nationality, citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of 
origin”. Regulations along this line continued until the adoption of the Canadian 
Bill o f Rights in 1960, although the power was not removed until the Immigration 
A ct of 1977.40
(b) The Franchise
The first restriction was in relation to the Chinese. In 1875, the British 
Columbia legislature denied them, as well as native Indians, the vote.41 This 
denial was extended, in 189542 and 18%,43 to include the Japanese, and in 1907 
to include “Hindus”.44 As mentioned earlier, this legislation was upheld by the 
Judicial Committee in 1903.45 Some six years later Saskatchewan, also, denied 
the franchise to the Chinese.46 It must be emphasized that all these denials 
applied to citizens as well.
The federal Parliament adopted these restrictions in 1920, by denying the 
franchise to anyone who was barred by provincial legislation47 although, as early
38 F. Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1972) at 101.
^S.C. 1952, c. 42.
40S.C. 1976-7, c. 52.
41S.B.C. 1875, No. 2, s. 1. See generally J. Gamer, The Franchise and Politics in British North America 
1755-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
42S.B.C. 1895, c. 20, s. 2.
43S.B.C. 1896, c. 28.
“ S.B.C. 1907, c. 16.
45Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, [1903] A.C. 151.
46R.S.S. 1909, c. 3, s. 11.
as 1885, the federal Electoral Franchise A ct had already excluded native Indians, 
and persons “of Mongolian or Chinese race”.48
The voting restrictions in British Columbia on the Chinese were not removed 
until 194749 and, on the Japanese, not until 1949.50 At the federal level, the 
franchise restrictions were removed from both groups in 1948,51 but not from the 
native peoples until I960.52
There were franchise restrictions on the basis of religion as well. For example, 
the British Columbia legislature denied the franchise to the Doukhobours from 
191953 to 1953,54 while the federal franchise was denied to them from 193855 
to 1955.56
(c) Other Discriminatory Laws
The denial of the franchise had a much wider effect than just that. Exclusion 
from the voters’ list also led to exclusion from municipal elections,57 elections of 
school trustees,58 and even from jury service.59 It also led to the denial of 
licences such as those to sell liquor,60 of becoming a member of the Law Society 
of British Columbia,61 or practicing pharmacy,62 all because a requirement for 
eligibility was to be on the voters’ list under the Provincial Elections Act.
48S.C. 1885, c. 40, s. 2.
49S.B.C. 1947, c. 28.
^S.B.C. 1949, c. 19.
51S.C. 1948, c. 46, s. 6.
52S.C. 1960, c. 7. See R.H. Bartlett, “Citizens Minus: Indians and the Right to Vote” (1980) 44 Sask. 
L. Rev. 163.
53S.B.C. 1919, c. 25, s. 2.
^S.B.C. 1953, c. 5, s. 4.
55S.C. 1938, c. 46, s. 4.
^S.C. 1955, c. 44, s. 4.
^R-S.B.C. 1924, c. 72, s. 4.
^R-S.B.C. 1924, c. 226, s. 42(1).
^R-S.B.C. 1924, c. 123, s. 4.
60Liquor Licence Act, 1899, S.B.C. 1899, c. 39. This act included a specific prohibition against any 
person of the "Indian, Chinese, or Japanese race" being issued a licence (s. 36).
61 Rules of the Law Society of British Columbia, no.39.
62Pharmacy By-laws, s. 15.
In addition, sales of British Columbia Crown lands made it a condition that 
Asiatics not be employed.63 An attempt was made in 1890 to deny Chinese 
employment underground in mines, but was invalidated on the ground that the 
legislation was in contravention of federal jurisdiction over aliens.64 In contracts 
awarded by the British Columbia Department of Public Works the contractor was 
required not to employ any Asiatic “directly or indirectly, upon, about or in 
connection with the works”.65 Without listing all of the restrictions, because of 
space limitations, it might be added that as late as 1936, by legislation,66 elderly 
Chinese and Japanese were denied the right to apply for admission to the British 
Columbia Provincial Home.
Lest one think that British Columbia was alone, remember that in 1912 
Saskatchewan prohibited white women and girls from working in Chinese-owned 
restaurants and laundries,67 while Ontario in 1914 prohibited them from working 
in Chinese business places.68
3. Racial Discrimination under the Common Law and the Civil Law
The leading decision is that of the Supreme Court of Canada given in 1939 in 
the case of Christie v. York Corporation.69 Christie was a black man (described by 
counsel for the respondent as “not extraordinarily black”) who was a season 
subscriber to hockey games in the Montreal Forum, where the respondent 
operated a beer tavern. The appellant had previously, while attending hockey * 
games, bought beer in the tavern. On the evening in question he had entered the 
tavern with two friends and ordered three steins of beer. The waiter declined to 
serve him and stated that he was instructed “not to served coloured people”.
When the manager affirmed the reason for the refusal, the appellant telephoned 
the police, to whom the manager repeated his refusal. Thereupon the appellant 
and his friends left the premises. Four of the five judges of the Supreme Court 
held that the respondent could refuse service to Christie on the ground that “the 
general principle of the law of Quebec was that of complete freedom of 
commerce”, and that it could not be argued “that the rule adopted by the
63This restriction was challenged, but upheld, in Brooks, Bidlake and Wfuttal Ltd  v. A.-G. for B.C., 
[1923] A.C. 450. The restrictions did not apply to Japanese because of a treaty with Japan.
64 Union Colliery of B.C. v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580.
^Common Form of Public Works Contract, Clause 45, quoted in H.F. Angus, “The Legal Status in 
British Columbia of Residents of Oriental Race and Their Descendants” (1931), 9 Can. Bar Rev. 1. 
See this article for a detailing of many of these restrictions.
^R-S.B-C. 1936, c. 228.
67S.S. 1912, c. 17.
^S.O. 1914, c. 40.
**[1940] S.C.R. 139.
respondent in the conduct of its establishment was contrary to good morals or 
public order”.
A year later the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the principles 
established by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Christie case were not confined 
to Quebec but were applicable in the common law provinces as well.70 Similarly, 
in 1961 the Alberta Court of Appeal, without written reasons, upheld a lower court 
decision that the plaintiff was not a “traveller” and the motel, which did not serve 
food, was not an “inn” and so was not bound by the principle of English common 
law applicable to inns.71
At the end of the Second World War a decision concerning a racially 
restrictive covenant not to resell land to “Jews, or to person of objectionable 
nationality”, gave an Ontario judge the opportunity to hold that such racially based 
grounds were contrary to public policy. The judge also held the covenant to be 
void for uncertainty and for being a restraint upon alienation.72 Subsequently, 
however, another restrictive covenant, prohibiting the sale of land to any person 
of “Jewish, Hebrew, Semetic, Negro, or coloured race or blood”, was upheld as 
valid by a lower court and by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 
did not agree that there was a ground of public policy to render such covenants 
void. Before the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the legislatures of 
both Ontario and Manitoba passed amendments to their property legislation 
providing that such covenants were invalid. Despite this further evidence of the 
view of legislatures about public policy on racial discrimination and restrictive 
covenants, the Supreme Court did not choose the egalitarian route, but rather held 
the covenant invalid because it did not relate to the use of land; it was also void 
for uncertainty.73
III. Human Rights (Anti-Discrimination) Laws
1. Removal of Discriminatory Laws
In the 122 years since Confederation our human rights concerned with equality 
have been fundamentally transformed in two ways. In the first place, it has come 
to be recognized that the promotion of some kinds of human rights requires 
government intervention and not just government abstention. In the second place, 
we are finally realizing that human rights must be extended to everyone in our
70 Rogers v. Clarence Hotel, [1940] 2 W.W.R. 545.
71 King v. Barclay and Barclay’s Motel (1961), 35 W.W.R. (N.S.) 240.
72 Re Drummond Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674.
73 Noble and Wolfv. Alley, [1951] S.C.R. 64.
society, regardless of such individual’s race, colour, religion, ethnic origin, sex, age, 
or handicap unrelated to job performance.
The statesmen of 1867 would probably have defined their civil liberties as 
including the freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, and association, the 
rights to habeas corpus, to a fair and public trial, and perhaps also such freedoms 
as freedom of contract, and such rights as that to property. It must be clear that 
the most important prerequisite for the promotion of these civil liberties is 
restriction upon excessive government interference, but ultimately recognizing the 
supremacy of Parliament.
Within the first half century after Confederation, the fallacy of relying upon 
this traditional approach was exposed. For one thing, the electorate did not 
include women until after World War I. For another, since legislatures are 
dependent upon majorities, we have seen that they could not always be relied upon 
to protect minorities.
Where the law was not positively restrictive of full civil liberties, its role was, 
as Anatole France put it, that of majestic impartiality. It forbade the rich and the 
poor equally to beg in the streets. The law presumed equality of standing between 
giant corporations and individual employees, and so asserted freedom of contract. 
The law assumed that rugged individualism, or at least private charity, would 
enable abandoned or orphaned children, deserted or widowed mothers, and the 
economically, physically or mentally handicapped, to forge their own bright futures.
It would not be an exaggeration to describe the transformation in the status 
of women and children during the past century as being that from chattels or 
things to human beings. Men had all the rights in 1867 and very few 
responsibilities to their wives or children. Late in the nineteenth century reform 
started with restrictions on female and child labour, and the introduction of 
compulsory school attendance. The franchise was extended to women after World 
War I.74 The protection which widowed mothers and orphaned children had 
under the laws of Quebec, against being disinherited, was extended to the common 
law provinces. The disadvantaged position of illegitimate children and adopted 
orphans was overcome by legislation which equated their rights to those of natural 
born children.
All these special legislative protections were further supplemented by 
governments taking it upon themselves to provide such social security measures 
as compensation for loss of job or limb or life, and assistance to the elderly, or the 
handicapped. What we have learned is that some freedoms must be restricted by 
increased responsibilities to guarantee the rights of others.
74Alberta was first: SA . 1916, c. 5; Quebec came last: S.Q. 1940, c. 7.
This statement leads me to discuss the other way in which I have described 
human rights as having been transformed since Confederation, and this was to 
assure human rights to everyone in our society.
In Canada, as I mentioned earlier, the first half century after Confederation 
witnessed an increase in the number of statutes which discriminated against certain 
people. Most of these were still with us until World War II. It is only since that 
time that all these laws have been repealed, probably partly as a reaction to the 
horrors of racism exhibited just before and during World War II, partly because 
of the coming to independence of tens of African and Asian former colonies, and 
partly because of the lead of the United Nations, both to bring about 
decolonization and to draft new standards condemning racial discrimination.
2) The Rise and Spread of Human Rights Legislation
The first minor changes came during the 1930s,75 but it was not until near the 
end of World War II that modern human rights legislation started to spread. In 
1944 the Province of Ontario enacted the Racial Discrimination Act, which 
prohibited the publication or displaying of signs, symbols, or other representations 
expressing racial or religious discrimination.76 The A ct was brief, and limited to 
one specific purpose, and it was not until 1947 that the first detailed and 
comprehensive statute was enacted: The Saskatchewan Bill o f Rights A c t.77
The Saskatchewan Bill did not deal only with antidiscrimination legislation, but 
with the fundamental freedoms as well. Moreover, it purported to bind the Crown 
and every servant and agent of the Crown. Enforcement of this legislation was 
through penal sanctions: the imposition of fines, perhaps injunctive proceedings, 
and imprisonment. There was no provision for any special agency charged with 
administration and enforcement of the Act. That was left to the regular 
enforcement of police and courts as would apply with respect to any other 
provincial statute that includes prohibitory provisions, such as the liquor or vehicles 
Acts.
Experience soon showed, as it had in the United States, that this form of 
protection — although better than none, and having a certain usefulness by way of 
indicating a government’s declaration of public policy -  was subject to a number 
of weaknesses. First, there was a reluctance on the part of the victim of 
discrimination to initiate the criminal action if complaint to the police had failed
75For example, the Ontario Insurance Act was amended to forbid discrimination in assessing risks (S.O. 
1932, c. 24); the Manitoba Libel Act was amended to prohibit group libel (S.M. 1934, c. 23).
76S.O. 1944, c. 51.
^S.S. 1947, c. 35.
to result in a prosecution and it always appeared that the police did not act. 
Second, there were all the difficulties of proving the offence to the criminal 
standard of proof, i.e beyond a reasonable doubt (and it is extremely difficult to 
prove that a person has not been denied access for some reason other than a 
discriminatory one). Third, there was reluctance on the part of the judiciary to 
convict — a reluctance probably based upon a feeling that some of the prohibitions 
impinged upon the traditional freedom of contract and the right to dispose of 
one’s property as one chose. Fourth, without extensive publicity and education, 
most people were unaware that such legislation existed for their protection. 
Members of minority groups, who were the frequent victims of discrimination, 
tended to be somewhat sceptical as to whether the legislation was anything more 
than a sop to the conscience of the majority. Fifth, and this was as important a 
factor as any, the sanction (in the form of a fine or even if it were imprisonment) 
did not help the person discriminated against in obtaining a job, a home, or service 
in a restaurant, hotel, or barbershop.
To overcome the weaknesses of quasi-criminal legislation, Fair 
Accommodation and Fair Employment Practices Acts were enacted. These new 
types of human rights provisions were copied from the legislative scheme first 
introduced on this continent in 1945 in the State of New York.78 The New York 
legislation was an adaptation of the methods and procedures that had proved 
effective in labour relations. These Acts provided for assessments of complaints, 
for investigation and conciliation, for the setting up of commissions or boards of 
inquiry where conciliation proved unsuccessful and — but only as a last resort — 
prosecution and the application of sanctions. The first of this new legislation, the 
Fair Employment Practices Act, was passed in Ontario in 1951,79 and within the 
next decade and a half most of the provinces enacted similar statutes. The first 
Fair Accommodation Practices Act was enacted by the Province of Ontario in 
1954,80 and again most of the other provinces followed within the decade.81
The Fair Employment and Accommodation Practices Acts were an 
improvement over the quasi-criminal approach, but they still continued to place 
the whole emphasis in promoting antidiscrimination legislation on the victims, who 
were obviously in the least advantageous position to help themselves, as if 
discrimination were solely their problem and responsibility. The result was that 
very few complaints were made and very little enforcement was achieved.
78N.Y. Public Laws of 1945, c. 118, added to Article 12 of Executive Law 1909; now see Article 15 of 
Executive Law of 1951.
^S.O. 1951, c. 24.
“ S.O. 1954, c. 28.
81For more details see my book Discrimination and the Law  (Toronto: De Boo, 1982) c. 2, rev’d. ed. 
by Wm. Pentney, 1985.
The next major step was taken by Ontario in 1962 with the consolidation of 
all human rights legislation into the Ontario Human Rights Code,82 to be 
administered by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, which had been 
established a year earlier. By 1975, every province in Canada had established a 
Human Rights Commission to administer antidiscrimination legislation and, in 
1977, the Canadian Human Rights A ct established a federal commission.83 With 
minor variations, all the legislation is similar except that Saskatchewan and Quebec 
have additional protections. Saskatchewan has continued the protection for 
fundamental freedoms introduced in its 1947 Bill o f Rights.84 Quebec, in its 
Charter o f Human Rights and Freedoms, has enacted a comprehensive Bill o f Rights 
which proclaims fundamental freedoms, legal civil liberties, egalitarian rights, and 
even economic and social rights.85
3) The Scope of Human Rights Legislation
All of the human rights acts in Canada prohibit discrimination on racial 
grounds, in the wide sense of “racial” defined in the United Nations Convention 
on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Thus, both “race” and 
“colour” are referred to in all the Acts. Other terms, relating to one’s ancestry 
or racial origin, include: “national extraction”, “national origin”, “place of birth”, 
“place of origin”, “ancestry”, “ethnic origin”, and “nationality”, with the last term 
used in Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatchewan. All prohibit discrimination on 
grounds of “religion” or “creed” or both.
In addition to the racial grounds, all jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of “sex” and, all but Alberta and Nova Scotia, on 
grounds of “marital status” or “family status” ; all prohibit discrimination on the 
ground of “age”, and five — Manitoba, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, 
Quebec and Yukon -  prohibit discrimination on the basis of “political opinion”, 
“belief’ or “convictions”. Four jurisdictions — Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and 
Yukon — prohibit discrimination based on “sexual orientation”. In addition, the 
Quebec Act adds “language” and “social condition” as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, while four — Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Nova 
Scotia — add “source of income”. The federal and Northwest Territories Acts 
include, as prohibited grounds of discrimination, “a conviction for which a pardon 
has been granted”. Discrimination on the grounds of physical or mental handicap 
or disability is now prohibited in all jurisdictions and, in addition, the federal and 
Prince Edward Island Acts include “dependence on alcohol or a drug.”
82S.O. 1960-61, c. 92.
“ S.C. 1976-77, c. 33.
MThe Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-21.1.
“ S.Q. 1975, c. 6.
The Acts address themselves to equality of access to places, activities, and 
opportunities. All Acts prohibit discrimination in employment; in the rented of 
dwelling and commercial accommodation; in accommodations, services, and 
facilities customarily available to the public; and in the publishing and/or 
displaying of discriminatory notices, signs, symbols, emblems or other 
representations. In addition, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, British Columbia, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan prohibit discrimination in the selling of real property. 
The Quebec Act appears to be the most comprehensive:
12. No one may, through discrimination, refuse to make a juridical act concerning
goods or services ordinarily offered to the public.
13. N o one may in a juridical act stipulate a clause involving discrimination.”
IV. The Constitution Act, 1982, and the Human Rights Codes
Not until the Constitution Act, 1982, was the constitutional position of equality 
rights in Canada changed from that set out in Union Colliery v. Bryden86 and 
Cunningham v. Tomey H om m a .87 I do not intend to discuss the equality rights 
in the new Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, rather, I want to discuss two ways in 
which the courts have elevated the status or increased the effect of Human Rights 
Codes since the enactment of the new Charter.
The first of these concerns the proof of discrimination by showing 
discriminatory effects, rather than by requiring proof of intent. Since the decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power (1971)88 boards of inquiry 
under the Human Rights Codes started to apply the “effects” definition of 
discrimination, but at first the courts did not.89
Early in its Charter interpretation the Supreme Court, in R. v. Big M  Drug Mart 
Ltd,90 came down explicitly in favour of looking at both the content or purpose 
of the law as well as, if necessary, its effects:
86 Supra, note 16.
87 Supra, note 17.
M401 U.S. 424.
^See the lower court decisions in the O ’Malley and Bhinder cases, infra, notes 91 and 92.
9<>rhis approach has been re-emphasized on at least two subsequent occasions, again not dealing with 
discrimination -  R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 752 concerning the impact 
of freedom of religion on provincial Sunday closing laws and R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1065 at 1070-
71 which held invalid the minimum requirement of 7 years for importation of narcotic drugs. It has 
also been re-emphasized in two cases concerned with antidiscrimination laws -  C.N.R. v. C.H.R.C., 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at 1134-38 and Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84 at 90.
... [T]he legislation’s purpose is the initial test of constitutional validity and its 
effects are to be considered when the law under review has passed or, at least, has 
purportedly passed the purpose test. If the legislation fails the purpose test, there 
is no need to consider further its effects, since it has already been demonstrated 
to be invalid. Thus, if a law with a vâlid purpose interferes by its impact, with 
rights or freedoms, a litigant could still argue the effects of the legislation as a 
means to defeat its applicability and possibly its validity. In short, the effects test 
will only be necessary to defeat legislation with a valid purpose; effects can never 
be relied upon to save legislation with an invalid purpose.
The result of Big M  was that the interpretation of Boards of Inquiry was 
affirmed in two Supreme Court of Canada decisions: Ontario Human Rights 
Commission and O ’Malley (Vincent) v. Simpsons-Sears91 and Bhinder and The 
Canadian Human Rights Commission v. The Canadian National Railway92
In the O ’Malley case McIntyre J. gave93 the unanimous decision of the Court. 
The crucial passages pertinent to this paper are:
... The Code aims at the removal of discrimination... Its main approach, however, 
is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of 
discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is 
significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one 
person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not 
imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory.
Furthermore,... we are dealing here with consequences of conduct rather than with 
punishment for misbehaviour. In other words, we are considering what are 
essentially civil remedies. The proof of intent, a necessary requirement in our 
approach to criminal and punitive legislation, should not be a governing factor in 
construing human rights legislation aimed at the elimination of discrimination... 
[T]he courts below were in error in finding an intent to discriminate to be a 
necessary element of proof.
...[T]he concept of adverse effect discrimination... arises where an employer for 
genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and 
which will apply equally to all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect 
upon a prohibited ground on one employee or group of employees in that it 
imposes, because of some special characteristic of the employee or group, 
obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of 
the work force... An employment rule honestly made for sound economic or
91[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
92[1985] 2 S.C.R. 561.
93Supra, note 91 at 549 and 551.
business reasons, equally applicable to all to whom it is intended to apply, may yet 
be discriminatory if it affects a person or group of persons differently for others 
to whom it may apply. From the foregoing I therefore conclude that the appellant 
showed a prima facie case of discrimination based on creed before the Board of 
Inquiry.
In the Bhinder case the Court split, but obviously not on the issue of the 
relevance of proof of “effects” discrimination. Mr. Justice McIntyre for the 
majority held that, since s.l4(a) of the Canadian Human Rights A ct provides that 
a refusal or inclusion proved by the employer to be a bona fide occupational 
requirement is not a discriminatory practice, and since the respondent met that 
burden of proof, the complaint must be dismissed. On that point Dickson C.J.C. 
and Lamer J. dissented. The explanation for their dissent may be found in the 
following passage:
Interpretation of s. 14(a) of the A ct must be consistent with advancing the ‘broad 
purposes’ of the A ct as established in s.2. In other words, the bona fide 
occupational requirement defense must not be given such wide parameters as to 
defeat the very purposes of the Act in which it is included.94
Perhaps the most important development in the view that courts have taken 
of human rights legislation is with respect to conflicts between such legislation and 
any other. Without going through all the steps in that evolution, one could 
illustrate the result with reference to the four most recent decisions on point. The 
first of these is Insurance Corporation o f B.C. v. Heerspink (1982),95 where the 
Supreme Court held, by a 6 to 3 majority, that sale of insurance coverage was “a 
service customarily available to the public”. With respect to a possible conflict 
between the B.C. Human Rights Code and the Insurance Act, Lamer J., on behalf 
3 of the 6 in the majority, asserted:
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive statement of the 
“human rights” of the people living in that jurisdiction, then there is no doubt in 
my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have through their legislature clearly 
indicated that they consider that law, and the values it endeavours to buttress and 
protect, are, save their constitutional laws, more important than all others. 
Therefore, short of that legislature speaking to the contrary in express and 
unequivocal language in the Code or in some other enactment, it is intended that 
the Code supersede all other laws when conflict arises.
94Supra, note 92 at 569. It has to be noted that more recently, in Alberta (H.R.C.) v. Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, a majority of the S.C.C. (Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson, L’Heureux-Dubé
and Cory JJ.) held that Bhinder was wrong in holding that there is no duty to accommodate in a case 
of adverse effect discrimination. In the latter case the court has to consider whether the employer 
could have accommodated the employee adversely affected, without undue hardship.
...[T]he Human Rights Code, when in conflict with “particular and specific 
legislation,” is not to be treated as another ordinary law of general application.
It should be recognized for what it is, a fundamental law.
Furthermore, as it is a public and fundamental law, no one, unless clearly 
authorized by law to do so, may contractually agree to suspend its operation and 
thereby put oneself beyond the reach of its protection.96
Some three years later, in The Winnipeg School Division v. Craton91 the 
Supreme Court was concerned with a conflict between the Manitoba Human Rights 
Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age without an upper limit, and 
a mandatory retirement provision in the Public Schools A ct 1980. Mr. Justice 
McIntyre, writing for the Court, said:
... I am in agreement with Monnin C.J.M. where he said... : “Human rights 
legislation is pubic and fundamental law of general application. If there is a 
conflict between this fundamental law and other specific legislation, unless an 
exception is created, the human rights legislation must govern.” This is in 
accordance with the views expressed by Lamer J. in ... Heerspink ... Human rights 
legislation is of a special nature and declares public policy regarding matters of 
general concern. It is not constitutional in nature in the sense that it may not be 
altered, or amended, or repealed by the legislature. It is, however, of such nature 
that it may not be altered, amended, or repealed, nor may exceptions be created 
to its provisions, save by clear legislative pronouncement.98
Finally, in the O ’Malley case, McIntyre J. again returned to this topic to 
declare:
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to 
recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and 
purpose of the enactment (see Lamer J. in ... Heerspink ...) and give to it an 
interpretation which will advance its broad purposes. Legislation of this type is of 
a special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary -  
and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.99
Similarly, although in the Bhinder case the Chief Justice dissented on the bona 
fide qualification issue, he agreed as concerns the status of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act. Specifically he stated his agreement with the Hearing Tribunal “that
^Ibid. at 157-58.
” (1985), 21 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
98Ibid. at 5-6.
99 Supra, note 91 at 547.
federal legislation is inoperative to the extent it conflicts with the Canadian 
Human Rights A ct”} 00
In summing up, with reference to these four Supreme Court cases, could one 
suggest that human rights legislation has now achieved, by judicial decision, the 
status of the Canadian Bill o f Rights — “not quite constitutional but certainly more 
than the ordinary”,101 at least to the level “that legislation is inoperative to the 
extent it conflicts with” such legislation?
Finally, it is interesting to note that the interpretation of discrimination issues 
under the Human Rights Codes may play an important role in interpretation of 
equality rights under the Charter. Thus in Andrews v. Law Society o f B.C.,102 
McIntyre J. referred to the evolution of the law under the Human Rights Codes 
as providing some guidance for determining what “discrimination” means in s. 15 
of the Charter. It is interesting to consider the differences:
... To begin with, discrimination in s .15(1) is limited to discrimination caused by the 
application or operation of law, whereas the Human Rights Acts apply also to 
private activities. Furthermore, and this is a distinction of more importance, all the 
Human Rights Acts passed in Canada specifically designate a certain limited 
number of grounds upon which discrimination is forbidden. Section 15(1) of the 
Charter is not so limited. The enumerated grounds in s. 15(1) are not exclusive and 
the limits, if any, on grounds for discrimination which may be established in future 
cases await definition. The enumerated grounds do, however, reflect the most 
common and probably the most socially destructive and historically practised bases 
of discrimination and must, in the words of s. 15(1), receive particular attention. 
Both the enumerated grounds themselves and other possible grounds of 
discrimination recognized under s. 15(1) must be interpreted in a broad and 
generous manner, reflecting the fact that they are constitutional provisions not 
easily repealed or amended but intended to provide a “continuing framework for 
the legitimate exercise of governmental power” and, at the same time, for “the 
unremitting protection” of equality rights: see Hunter \ .  Southam Inc. ..., [1984] 2 
S.C.R. 145 at p.155.
It should be noted as well that when the Human Rights Acts create exemptions or 
defences, such as a bona fide occupational requirement, an exemption for religious 
and political organizations, or definitional limits on age discrimination, these gen­
erally have the effect of completely removing the conduct complained of from the 
reach of the Act. ... “A ge” is often restrictively defined in the Human Rights 
Acts.... Where discrimination is forbidden in the Human Rights Acts, it is done in 
absolute terms, and where a defence or exception is allowed, it, too, speaks in
100 Supra, note 92 at 574. The Chief Justice referred with approval to these observations of McIntyre 
J. in C.N.R. v. C.H.R.C., supra, note 90.
101 Supra, note 99.
102 (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 16-18.
absolute terms and the discrimination is excused. There is, in this sense, no middle 
ground. In the Charter, however, while s .15( 1), subject always to s-s.(2), expresses 
its prohibition of discrimination in absolute terms, s .l makes allowance for a 
reasonable limit upon the operation of s. 15(1). A  different approach under s. 15(1) 
is therefore required. While discrimination under s .l5 (l)  will be of the same 
nature and in descriptive terms will fit the concept of discrimination developed 
under the Human Rights Act, a further step will be required in order to decide 
whether discriminatory laws can be justified under s.l. The onus will be on the 
state to establish this. This is a distinct step called for under the Charter which 
is not found in most Human Rights Acts, because in those Acts justification for or 
defence to discrimination is generally found in specific exceptions to the 
substantive rights.
Finally, in conclusion, let me say that we have come a long, long way. 
However,we need only remind ourselves of the work that Bernie Vigod was 
involved in when he died or observe racial tensions in such cities as Halifax, 
Montreal, Toronto or Vancouver or witness violence against women in secluded 
places or consider gender bias in our schools and work places, to realize that, 
although we have created the tools, we need greater resources and a continuing 
commitment to use them effectively.
